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Chapter 12
Aging and Housing Equity
Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise

Housing equity is the most important asset of many older Americans. In
principle, these assets could be used to support consumption after retirement, but earlier studies have concluded that unless there is an alteration in
family status, there is little if any reduction in housing equity as people age.∞
Indeed, our prior research concluded that even among movers, there was
little change in home equity. We did ﬁnd, however, that people with large
home equity relative to other welath were more likely to reduce home equity
when they moved, and those with low housing equity relative to other wealth
were more likely to increase home equity when they moved. Large reductions in home equity were typically associated with the death of a spouse or
with other precipitating shocks. Our earlier analyses relied on data from the
Retirement History Survey (RHS) and covered persons age ∑∫–π≥ interviewed over the ∞Ωπ≠s. Merrill (∞Ω∫∂) also analyzed RHS data and reached
conclusions consistent with ours. Feinstein and McFadden (∞Ω∫Ω) base their
analysis on information from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID),
a survey that includes households with heads over age π∑. Their ﬁndings
were also consistent with our earlier ﬁndings. In a somewhat later analysis,
Venti and Wise (∞ΩΩ∞) used data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) and again obtained ﬁndings consistent with prior studies. Sheiner and Weil (∞ΩΩ≥) ﬁnd some decline in home equity at older ages,
associated with shocks to family status and health; their results appear to us
to be consistent with the prior studies.
Despite the seeming unanimity of opinion, some alternative views have
recently begun to emerge. Recently, Megbolugbe et al. (∞ΩΩπ), using PSID
data, found that:
∞. Homeownership rates remain high until age π≠, after which a noticeable decline begins.
≤. Each year, Ωπ percent of homeowners remain owners, and Ω∞ percent
of renters remain renters. When they move, renters are more likely
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than owners to switch tenure, but renters are more likely to move, so
on net there is a trend to renting.
≥. When they move, owners aged ∑∑–∏∂ are more likely to trade down,
owners aged ∏∑–π∂ are more likely to trade up, and those π∑+ are as
likely to trade up as down.
∂. Liquidity constraints tend not to inﬂuence homeowning patterns. In
fact, asset-rich but income-poor households tend to trade up, in contrast to earlier ﬁndings.
Another study bucking the mainstream view was by Hurd (∞ΩΩΩ), who examined two waves of the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old
(AHEAD) survey. He concluded: ‘‘Downsizing of home owning is the norm,
and prior contradictory ﬁndings were due to inadequate data.’’
In this chapter we once again examine patterns of change in home equity
as peple age, using a new dataset. The key question we ask is whether housing wealth is typically used to support general consumption in old age. We
examine particularly attention to older households, between the age of π≠
and Ω≠, using data from the AHEAD.
To the extent that housing equity is treated just like ﬁnancial assets to
support consumption after retirement, it might be considered as a substitute for ﬁnancial wealth and perhaps treated interchangeably with ﬁnancial wealth in considering the wellbeing of the elderly. On the other hand, if
housing wealth is not drawn down with age, it may be more realistic to
consider nonhousing consumption derived mainly from accumulated ﬁnancial wealth, including social security and other annuities. Analysts considering how well households are prepared for retirement have treated
home equity in different ways. Some analysts include housing wealth in the
set of assets that can be used to ﬁnance retirement (Moore and Mitchell
≤≠≠≠; CBO ∞ΩΩ≥). Others exclude housing wealth in making a determination (Bernheim, ∞ΩΩ≤). Engen et al. (∞ΩΩΩ) and Gustman and Steinmeier
(∞ΩΩΩ) bound their estimates at ≠ and ∞≠≠ percent of housing equity.

Empirical Approach: Tracing Home Equity over the
Life Cycle
We consider ﬁrst the relationship between age and housing equity over the
life cycle, drawing on data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). We then turn to more detailed analysis for older households, using the AHEAD data. In particular we consider the effect of precipitating shocks. We have given considerable attention to the possibility of
possible misreporting and errors in the AHEAD data, yet we are left with
substantial noise in changes in housing wealth over time, particularly when
persons move. Indeed, the reduction in housing wealth calculated from the
difference between self-reported owner-occupied home value before sale
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and the reported sale value after moving may exaggerate to a considerable
degree the actual reduction in housing equity. There is substantial evidence
that respondents tend to overestimate the value of the house in which they
are living.

Findings Using SIPP Evidence
The SIPP provides housing equity values obtained from home value and
mortgage debt in seven years: ∞Ω∫∂, ∞Ω∫∑, ∞Ω∫π, ∞Ω∫∫, ∞ΩΩ∞, ∞ΩΩ≥ and ∞ΩΩ∑.≤
From the random sample of cross-section surveys in each of these years we
have created cohort data. For example, to trace the home equity of people
age ≤∏ in ∞Ω∫∂, we begin with the average home equity of persons age ≤∏
based on the random sample of persons age ≤∏ in the ∞Ω∫∂ survey. Next, we
obtain the average equity of people age ≤π from the ∞Ω∫∑ survey, age ≤Ω in
the ∞Ω∫π survey, and so forth. We identify cohorts by their age in the ∞Ω∫∂
survey. We do this for ∞π cohorts deﬁned by the age of the cohort in the ﬁrst
year of the data. In fact, to obtain more precise estimates of housing equity,
the data for a given cohort like age ≤∏ is the average of data for a three-year
age interval (≤∑, ≤∏, and ≤π). We do this for cohorts, age ≤∏, ≤Ω, . . . , π∞, π∂.
All cohorts are followed until age ∫≠ in the SIPP.≥
The fraction of two-person SIPP households who own a home, by cohort,
appears in Figure ∞. These patterns can be affected by differential mortality:
for example, suppose that homeowners were less likely to die at any age than
renters. Then the ownership rate rises with age simply because the owners
lived and the renters died. To account for this possibility, we have made a
mortality correction to the data (explained in the appendix), and report
these mortality-corrected data for two-person households. To make the ﬁgure easier to read, only selected cohorts are reported. The lesson of the
ﬁgure is that home ownership does not decline with age, at least through
age πΩ. In addition, there appear to be no important cohort effects until
about age π≠. That is, there are no large jumps when the data for one cohort
end and the data for another cohort begin. For the oldest ages, however,
there do appear to be noticeable cohort effects. Home ownership is lower
for the last two cohorts. Yet as with the other cohorts, there is no evident
decline in ownership as these cohorts age.
Figure ≤ reﬂects the result of ‘‘smoothing’’ SIPP data by regressing home
ownership on age, age squared, and age cubed, together with cohort effects.
The functional form is
Own = a + b∞A + b≤A≤ + b≥A≥ +

冘

diCi ,

cohort

where i indexes cohorts and di indicates the i th cohort effect. In this model,
the sum of the di s is zero. In Figure ≤, the ‘‘average’’ relationship between

Figure ∞. Percent owning homes among two-person households (mortality adjusted data from SIPP).
Source: Authors’ calculations from SIPP data.
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Figure ≤. Percent owning homes among two-person households (mortality adjusted data from SIPP,
smoothed). Source: Authors’ calculations from SIPP data.
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age and ownership, based on the age parameters in the above equation, is
shown by the heavy solid line. The cohort effects are represented by the
deviations of individual cohort lines from the overall average. These more
formal estimates indicate that both the oldest and the youngest cohorts are
less likely than the average to own, while the middle-aged cohorts are more
likely to own.
Home ownership data for one-person SIPP households are shown in Figure ≥. Again there is no apparent decline in ownership with age. Indeed, the
data seem to show some increase in ownership at the oldest ages.

Home Equity
Home equity values reported by two-person families are shown in Figure ∂.
These are in current dollars and thus reﬂect the inﬂuence of rising home
prices over the ∞Ω∫∂ to ∞ΩΩ∑ period, nor are the data corrected for differential mortality. The same data, now in ∞ΩΩ∑ dollars and corrected for mortality, appear in Figure ∑. Within a cohort, there is no decline in home
equity as the cohort ages; there may even be some increase in equity within a
cohort between age ∏∑–∫≠. There do appear to be some cohort effects in
equity, as evidenced by the jumps when the data for one cohort ends and the
data for another cohort begins.
To illustrate more clearly the cohort effects, we have ﬁt the cohort data with
a regression equation just like the one above, now replacing home ownership with home equity:
Equity = a + b∞A + b≤A≤ + b≥A≥ +

冘

diCi .

cohort

The results for selected cohorts are shown in Figure ∏ and for all SIPP
cohorts in Figure π. It is clear that both older cohorts—those over age π≠ in
∞Ω∫∂—and younger cohorts—those younger than ≥∏ in ∞Ω∫∂—have lower
home equity than the average, while the middle-aged cohorts have higher
equity than the average. For example, consider cohorts who attained age ≥≤
in successively later calendar years: The cohort that was age ≥≤ in ∞Ω∫∂ had
more home equity than the cohort aged ≥≤ in ∞Ω∫∫, and the later cohort had
more home equity than the cohort that attained age ≥≤ in ∞ΩΩ∑. We have not
analyzed the reason for the cohort effects in any systematic way, although
differences in housing price changes over time may explain the cohort
effects.∂
Figure ∫ shows the similar self-reported equity data for one-person households, and Figure Ω shows the data corrected for mortality and inﬂation. As
with the two-person households, there seems to be no decline in equity
through age π∫.

Figure ≥. Percent owning homes among one-person households (mortality adjusted data from SIPP).
Source: Authors’ calculations from SIPP data.
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Figure ∂. Home equity for two-person households (data from SIPP). Source: Authors’ calculations from SIPP
data.
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Figure ∑. Home equity for two-person households (mortality and CPI-adjusted data from SIPP). Source:
Authors’ calculations from SIPP data.
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Figure ∏. Home equity for two-person households (smoothed data from SIPP, selected cohorts). Source:
Authors’ calculations from SIPP data.
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Figure π. Home equity for two-person households (smoothed data from SIPP, all cohorts). Source: Authors’
calculations from SIPP data.

264
Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise

Figure ∫. Home equity for one-person households (data from SIPP). Source: Authors’ calculations from SIPP
data.
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Figure Ω. Home equity for one-person households (mortality and CPI-adjusted data from SIPP). Source:
Authors’ calculations from SIPP data.
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Findings Using AHEAD Data
To understand trends in home equity at older ages, we turn to an examination of the AHEAD data. Once again we consider home ownership cohort
data ﬁrst and then home equity cohort data. Then we consider the effect of
precipitating shocks strongly related to change in home equity at older ages.

Homeownership
AHEAD is a panel data ﬁle that follows the same families over time. We use
data from wave ∞ (∞ΩΩ≥) and wave ≤ (∞ΩΩ∑) of this survey, along with a
resurvey in ∞ΩΩ∫, wave ∂ of the Health and Retirement Study [HRS]. Thus we
have three data points spanning ﬁve years for each household. To obtain
cohort data comparable to the SIPP, we construct cohorts data by grouping
AHEAD households in two-year age intervals. These constructed cohorts are
the basis for our cohort evidence shown next.
Homeownership cohort data for two-person families appear in Figure ∞≠,
which covers ages from π≠ to Ω≠. A comparison of these with the SIPP data in
Figure ∞ shows that the ownership percent for two-person families in their
early π≠s is about Ω≠ percent in both sources, though the AHEAD results
suggest a modest decline in ownership among persons in their π≠s. Nevertheless, the within-cohort data do not show a decline in ownership at older
ages, though there are cohort effects, with lower ownership among the
oldest cohorts.
Analogous information for one-person households appear in Figure ∞∞.
For these households, the within-cohort data do suggest a decline in ownership as persons age. But they also suggest a positive cohort effect, with
higher ownership among households in their ∫≠s than among those in their
late π≠s.

Home Equity
CPI-adjusted home equity cohort information for two-person households is
shown in Figure ∞≤, and here there is a rather consistent decline with age in
housing equity with no substantial cohort effects. (The anomalous age ∫≤
cohort data are apparently the result of a small sample size.) Equity patterns
for one-person households are shown in Figure ∞≥ and also show consistent
decline with age, and without noticeable cohort effects with the possible
exception of the oldest cohort.
When we amalgamate the patterns observed in the SIPP and AHEAD
surveys for two-person households (Figures ∑ and ∞≤), our tentative conclusion is that home equity seems to peak in the early ∏≠s and remain more
or less constant until the early π≠s. Thereafter, there may be some modest decline in home equity. Among one-person households, the evidence

Figure ∞≠. Percent owning homes for two-person households (data from AHEAD). Source: authors’ calculations from SIPP data.
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Figure ∞∞. Percent owning homes for one-person households (data from AHEAD). Source: authors’ calculations from SIPP data.
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Figure ∞≤. Home equity for two-person households (CPI-adjusted data from AHEAD). Source: Authors’
calculations from SIPP data.
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Figure ∞≥. Home equity for one-person households (CPI-adjusted data from AHEAD). Source: Authors’
calculations from SIPP data.
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(Figures Ω and ∞≥) is similar, although the decline in the mid π≠s seems
larger and perhaps more consistent.

How Changes in Family Status Influence Home Equity in
the AHEAD Data
We begin by exploring change in home ownership, by initial ownership
status and by change in family status, again considering two- and one-person
households separately.
We focus on changes in ownership during the ∞ΩΩ≥–Ω∑ interval and the
∞ΩΩ∑–Ω∫ interval. Data from both periods are combined in the table (separate analyses for each of the two intervals revealed similar results). Table ∞
pertains to two-person families who were homeowners at the beginning of
the periods.∑ Of all two-person households at the beginning of the period,
∫π.∫ percent initially owned a home. Of those initial owners, most (Ω∂.π
percent) still owned a home by the end of the period, ∞.Ω percent were
renting by the end of the period, and ≥.∑ percent had some other living
arrangement. The remainder of the panel shows transitions by family status
change. For example, consider two-person households at both the beginning and the end of the period (≤ to ≤ households, representing ∫≤.∂ percent of initial owners): of these, Ω∏.∏ percent still owned at the end of the
period. Of the Ω∏.∏ percent, Ω∑.∏ percent were still in the same home, while
∂.∂ percent had moved to a different house. A small portion of the continuing homeowner two-person households (∞.∑ percent) was renting at the end
of the period. Of this group, ≤∑ percent still lived in the same house (perhaps the home had been transferred or sold to children).
The remainder of the panel shows outcomes for households that experienced shocks to family status. The rows labeled ‘‘≤ to ∞’’ pertain to households that had two members in the initial period and one member in the
subsequent period. The rows labeled ‘‘≤ to NH’’ include all households with
two members in the initial period and at least one member in a nursing
home in the subsequent period. Households that changed from two- to oneperson were more likely to change ownership: ∫Ω.∏ percent still owned at
the period end, but ≥.≤ percent were renting, and π.≤ percent had some
other living arrangement. Most of these were living with children. The third
family status change is from a two-person household to a nursing home for
at least one member of the household at the end of the interval. Of these
households, only ∏∏.≥ percent were still owners, ∂.∑ percent rented, and
≤Ω.≤ percent had another living arrangement. The implication of our data is
that most moves are associated with a precipitating shock—the death of a
spouse or with entry to a nursing home.
Changes in home equity that parallel the observed changes in home
ownership are shown in detail in Table ≤ (all values are in ∞ΩΩ∑ dollars). The
last column shows the mean initial housing equity for each of the transition
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Table 1. Changes in Family Status and Homeownership: AHEAD, ∞ΩΩ≥–Ω∑,
∞ΩΩ∑–Ω∫, Two-Person Households at Beginning of Interval Only
Subsequent Status
Initial Family Status
and Change
Own
≤ to ≤
Stay
Move
≤ to ∞
Stay
Move
≤ to NH
Stay
Move

Own (%)

Rent (%)

Other (%)

Ω∂.π
Ω∏.∏
Ω∑.∏
∂.∂
(∞≠≠)
∫Ω.∏
Ω≤.∂
π.∏
(∞≠≠)
∏∏.≥
∫Ω.∫
∞≠.≤
(∞≠≠)

∞.Ω
∞.∑
≤∑
π∑
(∞≠≠)
≥.≤
∞≥.≥
∫∏.π
(∞≠≠)
∂.∑
≤∑
π∑
(∞≠≠)

≥.∑
∞.Ω
π∫
≤≤
(∞≠≠)
π.≤
∂∞.≤
∑∫.∫
(∞≠≠)
≤Ω.≤
≠
∞≠≠
(∞≠≠)

Initial Home Ownership
and Family Status
Change (%)
∫π.∫
∫≤.∂

∞∂.∫

≤.∫
(∞≠≠)

Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD and HRS data; data for one-person households
available on request.
Note: NH means at least one member in nursing home.

Table 2. Mean Change in Home Equity by Initial Homeownership and Family
Status Change: ∞ΩΩ≥–Ω∑, ∞ΩΩ∑–Ω∫, Two-Person Households at Beginning
of Interval Only
Subsequent Status
Initial Family Status
and Change
Own
≤ to ≤
Stay
Move
≤ to ∞
Stay
Move
≤ to NH
Stay
Move

Own

Rent

Other

All

Initial
Home
Equity

$≤≠≤∏
≤∑∞∏
–Ω∞πΩ
–∞≠≤≥≥
–∞≠∞∞≥
–∞∞∑Ω∫
∂∫≥∂
∂∏π∫
∏≤∑≥

$–π≥≠∞∞
–∏∞≤≥∞
–ππ≥≠≥
–∏∫∏≥Ω
–∞∫∏∞∏
–π∞πΩ∑
–∂Ω∞∞∫
–πΩ≤≠π
–∂∑∂∂∞

$–π∫∂∫∫
–∫≤∫∏Ω
–∑πΩ∫Ω
–∞≠∫≤Ω∑
–∞≤∂∑∂∏
–Ωπ≤∏∞
–∞≠≤∫≤π
—
–∞≠≤∫≤π

$–≥∏≠≥
–∑∑≥
Ω≥∏
–≤∏≠Ω≥
–∞∫∏≥≥
–∞≥∏∏∫
–∂∫∞≥∫
–≤∂∑∂∑
∂≠≠∑
–π∑∞≠∂

$∞∞≠∑≤∂
∞∞≠∞∏∑
∞≠Ω∂∑∏
∞≤≤≥π∞
∞∞≥π∑∑
∞∞≤∏≤≤
∞≤≠≥Ω≥
∞∞Ω≠≤≠
∞∞≤∫∞∏
Ω≤∂∏∞

Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD and HRS data; data for one-person households
available on request.
Note: — means not calculated due to small sample sizes.
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groups. The average for all initial homeowners was $∞∞≠,∑≥∂, and the average decline over the two intervals was $≥,∏≠≥, accounting for about ∞∑
percent of the average income of these households or about ≥.∂ percent of
non-housing wealth.
The upper left portion of the table pertains to two-person households
that owned a home at both the beginning and the end of the interval. On
average, their housing equity increased by about $≤,≠≠≠. This was due to
non-movers, since movers reduced their home equity by $Ω,∞πΩ, or about π.∑
percent of their average initial home value. It must be recalled that the
typical elderly household only moves once, so the reduction will likely be a
one-time reduction. In evaluating the change in home values of movers, one
might therefore use the change for ‘‘stayers’’ as a control, suggesting that in
this case movers actually reduce home equity by $∞∞,∏Ω∑. Nevertheless the
reduction in home equity when people move may be exaggerated, as discussed below.
It is clear from this table that moves associated with changes in household
structure do produce large changes in home equity. The data also show a
reduction in the home equity of stayers who changed from a two- to a oneperson household. It is possible that this change represents random misreporting, perhaps because the more knowledgeable respondent is no
longer in the household. To reduce errors in data reporting, we therefore
report medians in Table ≥. (In addition of course, the medians may be
different from the means simply because of the shape of the distributions of
accurately reported data.) In some cases there are large differences between
the medians and the means. For example, the median reduction for continuing owners who move is now $∑,≤Ω∂, instead of almost twice that level
($Ω,∞πΩ). The overall reduction for continuing two-person households who
moved is $∞≤,∫≠∑, instead of $≤∏,≠Ω≥. The reduction for all initial owners is
$≤,∑∂≠, instead of $≥,∏≠≥.
Supporting the view that reporting errors may yield exaggerated reductions in housing equity when homeowners move, we cite previous studies
that conclude that homeowners do tend to overestimate the value of their
homes (cf Kiel and Zabel ∞ΩΩΩ). Hence the realized sale price of a home is
typically more accurate but lower than the prior estimated home value,
which would create a bias in our estimate of the change in housing equity
among movers. We believe that both the AHEAD and HRS data show this
tendency. In AHEAD≤ (∞ΩΩ∑) and HRS∂ (∞ΩΩ∫), widows were asked if they
sold their homes since the last interview. If so, they were asked for the selling
price. If the recent sale price was accurately reported as we expect, then the
difference in the pre-sale estimated value and the post-sale price would be a
measure of how much people ‘‘overestimate’’ housing values. The estimated
home values and the reported sale prices for these widows suggest that
home values are overstated by about ∞≠ percent.∏ If this were more generally
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Table 3. AHEAD, Median Change in Home Equity by Initial Homeownership and
Family Status Change, ∞ΩΩ≥–Ω∑ and ∞ΩΩ∑–Ω∫, Two-Person Households at
Beginning of Interval
Subsequent Status
Initial Family Status
and Change
Own
≤ to ≤
Stay
Move
≤ to ∞
Stay
Move
≤ to NH
Stay
Move

Own

Rent

Other

$–∞∂∫∫
–∞∂≠≤
–∑≤Ω∂
–∂Ω≠
∫≥
–≤∂∑∫Ω
–π≠∞≤
–π≠∞≤
∂∏≤≥

$–∏≠≠≠≠
–∏∏∑≥∂
–∏≠≠≠≠
–∑≤∫≠∑
–∞≤≠≠≠
–∑≤∫≠∑
–∂π∑≤∂
–πΩ≤≠π
–∂π∑≤∂

$–∑∫≠∫∑
–∏≥≥∏∏
–∑π≠≤Ω
–πΩ≤≠π
–∏∫∏∂∏
–∫∑≠≠≠
–∫∂∂∫∫
–∫∂∂∫∫

All

Initial
Home
Equity

$–≤∑∂≠
–≤∞∏∑
–∞Ω∏≥
–∞≤∫≠∑
–≥Ω∫∂
–∫∂∞
–∂π≤∞≤
–∞≤∑π≥
–π≠∞≤
–∑≠∏Ω≥

$∫∂∂∫∫
∫∂∂∫∫
∫∂∂∫∫
∞≠≠≠≠≠
∫≠≠≠≠
∫≠≠≠≠
∫∑≠≠≠
π≥≤Ωπ
π∑≠≠≠
∏∫∏∂∏

Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD and HRS data.
*This is the ﬁrst panel from Appendix Table ≥a.

true, our estimates of the reduction in home equity when a home is sold
could be overestimated by as much as $∞≠,≠≠≠ to $∞≤,≠≠≠. Indeed, the reported reduction in mean housing equity when continuing two-person
households move from one home to another (–$Ω,∞πΩ) might fully attributable to exaggeration of the initial home value.

More Formal Estimates of Home Equity Change
We return to an examination of the change in home equity of movers and
stayers, now considering movers as the ‘‘treatment’’ group and stayers as the
‘‘control’’ group. In this case, the home equity of stayers and movers at the
beginning and at the end of the interval can be represented by a two-by-two
matrix as follows:
Beginning

End

Stayers

a

a+t

Movers

a

a + t +m

In this case, a difference-in-difference estimate ((a + t + m – a) – (a + t –
a) = m), yields the ‘‘treatment’’ effect m. We can estimate m for all households combined, or for any subgroup, by
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q E = t + mM ,

where t is a constant term and represents a time (inﬂation) effect and m
is the additional effect for movers, with M a dummy variable identifying
movers. The same equation can be estimated for any subgroup using the
speciﬁcation
q Ek = (tk + mkM ) * Dk ,

where the dummy variables D represent different changes in family status
and home ownership.
Estimates obtained in this way are shown in Table ∂, which presents estimates only for people who were homeowners at the beginning of the interval. Data are presented by the subsequent (at the end of the interval) status
of the initial homeowners. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are
shown in the left portion of the table, and the right portion shows median
regression estimates. The latter estimates are not as sensitive as OLS estimates to reporting errors or other data outliers. In either case, the change in
equity of movers is likely to be overestimated because of the inﬂated assessment of home values, as explained above.
For all two-person homeowner stayers, the change in home equity was not
signiﬁcantly different from zero based on the OLS estimates, but the median
regression estimates suggest that home values fell somewhat during the intervals. For continuing homeowners, the OLS estimates show no statistically
signiﬁcant reduction in home equity, even for movers (with the exception of
the anomaly for stayer households whose family status changed from two to
one). The median results show some statistically signiﬁcant, but smaller,
declines. Accounting for the tendency to overestimate the value of owneroccupied housing, it is likely that continuing owners—even movers—had
no decline in housing value, and they may have even increased housing
equity. Recall that the results for widows above suggest that the method used
here may exaggerate the decline in equity by $∞≠,≠≠≠–$∞≤,≠≠≠.
Important declines in home equity do occur among the ∞.Ω percent of
two-person families who switch from owning to renting, and the ≥.∑ percent
who switch from owning to some other living arrangement. First, none of
the ‘‘mover’’ effects for those who switch from owning to renting or other
are signiﬁcantly different from zero. This suggests that there is no difference
in the reduction of housing equity between movers and stayers. In the
AHEAD data, of the nearly ≤∑ percent of those reported to switch from
owning to renting who have not moved from their initial home. Further, the
housing equity of all the new renters who are ‘‘stayers’’ is reduced by around
$∏≠,≠≠≠, as estimated by both OLS and median regression.
Given this apparent anomaly, we put little faith in the ‘‘control’’ method
results reported here, but we do tentatively conclude that those who switch
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Table 4. Estimates of Mover Equity Effect Using Stayers as ‘‘Control’’ Group, for Initial
Homeowners, Two-Person Households, by Estimation Method
Subsequent
ownership and
family status
change

OLS estimates
coef

All

Median regression estimates
Movers

Stayers

Movers

Stayers

t-stat

coef

t-stat

coef

t-stat

coef

t-stat

–∫≠π

≠.≤

–≥π≤∞π

≤.∫

–≤≠∞≤

∂.∏

–≤∏∫≥≤

∞π.∑

Own at end of interval
All
∞≠≤≠
≤ to ≤
≤∑∞∏
≤ to ∞
–∞≠∞∞≥
≤ to N
∂∏π∫

≠.≥
≠.∏
≤.∞
≠.∂

–∞≠≠∫∑
–∞∞∏Ω∏
–∞∂∫∑
∞∑π∂

≠.∏
≠.∑
≠.∞
≠.∞

–∞∑≥∂
–∞∂≠≤
∫≤.π
–π≠∞≤

≥.≥
≤.Ω
≠.∞
≤.π

–∑π∞≠
–≥∫Ω≤
–≤∂∏π≤
∞∞∏≥∑

≤.∫
∞.π
∂.∂
∞.π

Rent at end of interval
All
–∑∫Ω≥∑
≤ to ≤
–∏∞≤≥∞
≤ to ∞
–∞∫∏∞∏
≤ to N
–πΩ≤≠π

≥.Ω
≥.∏
≠.≥
∞.∫

–∞∂∂≤∂
–∞∏≠π≤
–∑≥∞πΩ
≥≥π∏∏

≠.Ω
≠.∫
≠.Ω
≠.π

–∏∏∑≥∂
–∏∏∑≥∂
–∞≤≠≠≠

≥.∫
≥.∑
≠.∏

π∑≥∂
∏∑≥∂
–∂≠∫≠∑

≠.∂
≠.≥
∞.∫

Other at end of interval
All
–Ω≤≤πΩ
≤ to ≤
–∫≤∫∏Ω
≤ to ∞
–∞≤∂∑∂∏
≤ to N
–∞≠≤∫≤π

∏.Ω
∑.π
≥.∫
∑.Ω

–∑≥∏
≤∂∫∫≠
≤π≤∫∑

≠.≠
≠.π
≠.∏

–∏≥≥∏∏
–∏≥∏∏
–∏∫∏∂∏
–∫∂∂∫∫

∫.≤
∂.Ω
≥.≤
∑.∑

–∞∞∏≥∂
∏≥≥π
–∞∏≥∑∂

∞.∞
≠.≤
≠.∏

Source: Authors’ calculations from AHEAD and HRS data. Data for ∞-person households available on
request.

from owning to renting release home equity worth about $∏≠,≠≠≠. In future
analysis, we will seek to determine whether this change in home equity for
‘‘stayers’’ or ‘‘movers’’ shows up as an increase in other assets. Similar anomalies show up in the data for those who switch from owning a home to some
other living arrangement. We therefore tentatively conclude that housing
equity is reduced by somewhere between $∏≠,≠≠≠ and $∞≠≠,≠≠≠ for this
group.
Comparable estimates for single persons not reported in detail here indicate that the housing equity of stayers was reduced by $≤,≠≠≠ to $∂,≠≠≠.
Contrary to national data on home values, these estimates imply that home
values declined over the survey intervals. On average, the ∞∞ percent of oneperson households who moved reduced housing equity by approximately
$∂≠,≠≠≠ to $∑≠,≠≠≠. After accounting for the overestimation in the selfreported value of owner-occupied housing, these reductions would be less.
Like two-person households, one-person households do not typically reduce home equity if they continue to own. Indeed, for continuing owners,
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none of the move effects are signiﬁcantly different from zero. As with twoperson households there appear to be many anomalies in the data for those
who report switching from homeowners to renting or to ‘‘other.’’

Conclusion and Discussion
In examining the change in home equity as families age, we ﬁnd that,
barring changes in household structure, elderly families are unlikely to
discontinue home ownership: only about ∑.∂ percent of older two-person
households owning a home change status over a ≤∞⁄≤ year period. Even
among movers who continue to own, we argue that there is essentially no
reduction in mean home equity, allowing for what appears to be some
exaggeration in self-reported home value Liquidation of home equity is
more likely in the face of precipitating shocks, experienced by about ∞∫ percent of older two-person families over ≤∞⁄≤ year period. When a spouse dies,
about ∞≠ percent of these households discontinue home ownership; about
≥∑ percent discontinue home ownership when a spouse enters a nursing
home. The reduction in home equity among families that discontinue
ownership is between $∏≠,≠≠≠ to $π≠,≠≠≠. Mean home equity among all
families that experience these shocks is over $∞∞≠,≠≠≠. Thus we conclude
that home equity is typically not liquidated to support general nonhousing
consumption needs. While the results presented here are based in large
part on the home equity of families aged π≠ and older, the results are much
like those reported in earlier work based mainly on families under age π∑.
These results suggest to us that when assessing whether families have
saved enough to maintain their preretirement standard of living after retirement, housing equity should not be counted on to support general
nonhousing consumption. Families apparently do not intend to save for retirement through investment in housing, as they might through a ∂≠∞(k)
plan or through some other ﬁnancial form of saving. Rather our ﬁndings indicate that families purchase homes to provide an environment in
which to live, even as they age through retirement years. It may be appropriate, nevertheless, to think of housing as a reserve or buffer that can be
used in catastrophic circumstances that result in a change in household
structure.
These conclusions correspond closely to the ﬁndings of a recent survey of
older households (age ∂∑+) sponsored by the AARP. Respondents were
asked, ‘‘Do you agree with the statement: ‘What I’d really like to do is stay in
my current residence as long as possible.’ ’’ Over π∑ percent of the ∂∑–∑∂year-olds indicated that they ‘‘strongly agree’’ or ‘‘somewhat agree’’ with the
statement, while Ω∑ percent of those π∑+ concurred. In addition, nearly π∑
percent of the respondents age ∑∑+ thought that their current residence is
where they would always live. When asked what they would prefer to do if
they eventually needed help caring for themselves, they responded over-

Aging and Housing Equity

279

whelmingly that they preferred to remain in their current home, with assistance. As with our ﬁndings, the AARP survey also implies that most older
households do not intend to liquidate housing equity to support retirement
consumption.
Even in the face of precipitating shocks, when home equity is sometimes
liquidated, we have yet to determine how the funds from the sale of a home
are used. Do funds show up as an increase in ﬁnancial assets? Are the assets
transferred to children? How much is used to support general consumption? How much goes to nursing home expenses or costs associated with the
death of a spouse? We will return to these issues in future research.

Appendix: Mortality Correction
Our analysis using the SIPP data is based on cohorts constructed from crosssection surveys. For example, the home ownership (or home equity) proﬁle
for a cohort is constructed by combining data for all households age A in the
ﬁrst survey year with data for households age A + T from a survey T years
later. If the likelihood of survival from A to A+T is related to wealth, then
these cohort proﬁles can be affected by differential mortality. We correct for
this problem by reweighting the sample. Households are assigned an adjusted weight that is inversely related to the probability of survival from age
A to age A+T.
Baseline estimates of these survival probabilities for one- and two-person
households are obtained from waves ∞ and ≤ of AHEAD. A one-person
household ‘‘survives’’ if that person is present in both waves ∞ and ≤. A twoperson household ‘‘survives’’ if both members are present in the second
wave. Survival probabilities are estimated from the AHEAD for ﬁve year age
intervals and for housing equity quartiles. Older households and households with lower levels of housing wealth are less likely to survive. Since the
AHEAD only includes households age π≠ and over, published survival rates
by age (from the NCHS) were used to extrapolate the AHEAD survival
probabilities back to age ∑≠.
The ﬁnal step is to reweight the data. For each household observation of
age A and housing equity quartile Q , the SIPP frequentcy weight is multiplied by the inverse of the cumulative survival probability. The survival
probabilities are assumed to be one for households less than age ∑≠. Thus
households that are unlikely to survive are given higher weights. For each
observation the probability of surviving to age A given equity quartile Q is
where s(a,a+∞;Q) is the one-year survival rate for a household in equity
quartile Q. For each household in each year the SIPP frequency weight is
multiplied by the inverse of S(A,Q):

写
A

S(A,Q ) =

a = ∑≠

s(a,a + ∞:Q ) .
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Notes
The authors thank Todd Sinai, Olivia Mitchell, and Alan Gustman for their comments, and thank the National Institute on Aging for ﬁnancial support. Our analysis
uses data from preliminary releases of AHEAD wave ≤ and HRS wave ∂. These data
have not been cleaned and may contain errors that will later be corrected in the ﬁnal
public release.
∞. See Venti and Wise (∞Ω∫Ωa, b, ∞ΩΩ≠), Merrill (∞Ω∫∂), and Feinstein and McFadden (∞Ω∫Ω).
≤. The survey panels and wave that provide the data are as follows:
Panel Wave Dates in Field
Panel Wave Dates in Field
∞Ω∫∂
∞Ω∫∂
∞Ω∫∑
∞Ω∫∑
∞Ω∫∏
∞Ω∫∏

∂
π
≥
π
∂
π

Sept–Dec ∞Ω∫∂
Sept–Dec ∞Ω∫∑
Sept–Dec ∞Ω∫∑
Jan–Apr ∞Ω∫π
Jan–Apr ∞Ω∫π
Jan–Apr ∞Ω∫∫

∞Ω∫π
∞ΩΩ≠
∞ΩΩ∞
∞ΩΩ≤
∞ΩΩ≥

∂
∂
π
∂
π

Feb–May ∞Ω∫∫
Feb–May ∞ΩΩ∞
Feb–May ∞ΩΩ≥
Feb–May ∞ΩΩ≥
Feb–May ∞ΩΩ∑

≥. Data for households over age ∫≠ are not used because age is top-coded at ∫≠.
∂. For example, referring to Figure ∑, assume that homes are bought at age ≥∑ on
average, and consider the cohort that was age ∑≠ in ∞Ω∫∂ compared to the cohort
that was age ≥∫ in ∞Ω∫∂. The older cohort bought homes in ∞Ω∏Ω on average and
would have gained from large home price increases in the ∞Ωπ≠s. On the other hand,
the younger cohort would have bought homes in ∞Ω∫∞ on average and would have
seen much lower increases in home equity during the ∞Ω∫≠s and ∞ΩΩ≠s.
∑. We have not made a correction for the different lengths of the periods. If people
who own at the beginning of a period are equally likely to move in any of the next few
years, then more people would have moved during the ≤-year than during the ≤-year
period. Thus on average these are move rates over a ≤∞⁄≤-year period.
∏. A comparison of estimated home values and sale prices shows:
Mean Estimate
Survey Interval
of Home Value
Mean Reported Sale
and Sample
in Initial
Price in Next
Size
Survey Year
Survey Year
Difference
∞ΩΩ≥–Ω∑
N = ∞∑≤
∞ΩΩ∑–Ω∫
N = ∞π∫

Ω≠,∑∞≤

∫≠,∫∞∏

–Ω,∏Ω∏

∞≤≥,∏π≤

∞∞∞,≠∂≥

–∞≤,∏≥≠
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